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Abstract
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information
regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric informa-
tion the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk
(CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk,
loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. How-
ever, CVaR regulation distorts the operation of credit markets. We
show that a binding CVaR constraint introduces credit rationing and
lowers social welfare. CVaR regulation also affects the operation of
monetary policy.
1 Introduction
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach to financial risk management is increas-
ingly being used by regulators to set capital requirements for banks and other
financial intermediaries. The current regulation for banks according to the
1988 Basel Accord is outdated. The 1988 Accord insufficiently differentiates
between different credit risks and it does not recognize risk-mitigation tech-
niques and diversification effects. The internal model based VaR approach
is intended to overcome these drawbacks for market risk. The new Basel 2
framework will allow the use of those VaR techniques to evaluate credit risk.
This should improve regulatory incentives by connecting the regulatory cap-
ital more closely to the actual credit risk as estimated by banks. However,
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the general equilibrium effects of this new framework are not yet completely
understood. We investigate the ramifications of CVaR regulation for the
operation of credit and deposit markets.
The Accord allows for two main approaches to evaluate credit risk inher-
ent in individual loans. Banks may use a standardized approach to risk as-
sessment, employing the ratings provided by external credit rating agencies,
or alternatively, banks with sufficiently developed risk assessment systems
may use an internal-ratings-based method to estimate the credit risk of their
portfolios. Regardless the system being used, whenever the regulatory capi-
tal constraint becomes binding, this imposes an upper bound on the risk of
the portfolio.
The consequences of the introduction of simple and risk-weighted capital
adequacy requirements have been studied intensively. A theoretical overview
of the need for banking supervision and the consequences for incentives can
be found in Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994),
who study the microeconomic foundations of the banking industry. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) provides a good overview of the
empirical impact of the 1988 Accord. In this paper we show that a Credit
risk model based Value-at-Risk (CVaR) constraint, when binding, induces
credit rationing by banks.
From the literature we know that imperfect information on loan appli-
cants can cause credit rationing, see Stiglitz andWeiss (1981) andWilliamson
(1986). However, the influence of bank regulation is absent from these mod-
els. Thakor (1996) models bank lending in the case of adverse selection and
bank capital requirements. He does not, however, model VaR regulation.
To the best of our knowledge the effect that CVaR regulation induces credit
rationing is novel to the literature.
Understanding the distortionary effects on the credit market of Value-at-
Risk based regulation is important, but the bank loan market is also relevant
for monetary policy. Mishkin (1996) provides an overview of the broad liter-
ature on the transmission channels of monetary policy. Dissatisfaction with
conventional views of how interest rates explain the effects of monetary policy
has recently led to a revival of the credit channel of monetary policy.
The credit channel approach to monetary policy consists of both a general
credit channel and a lending channel. According to the general balance
sheet channel theory, the effects of monetary policy on interest rates are
amplified by endogenous changes in the external finance premium, which is
the difference in cost between funds raised externally and funds generated
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internally (Bernanke and Gertler (1995), see also Hubbard (2000)). The size
of this premium reflects imperfections in the credit markets. According to the
bank lending channel of monetary policy bank credit is special for firms. The
information problem in the supply of credit from banks to firms generates
frictions which make it difficult for banks to increase the supply of credit when
demand rises. We model this friction in bank loan supply explicitly. Stein
(1998) shows that asymmetric information between depositors and banks
generates frictions in the lending channel. We model another aspect of the
lending channel by modelling asymmetric information between banks and
borrowing firms, which results in adverse selection.
To demonstrate that CVaR regulation may induce credit rationing, we
adopt a standard model from the literature. The model was first developed
by Jaffee and Russel (1976) and Mankiw (1986). Freixas and Rochet (1997)
contains a concise description of the model. The contribution of the paper is
not in the development of a newmodel of the credit market, though we extend
the model by endogenizing the supply of deposits1. This closure of the model
helps to gauge the equilibrium effects of the Basle regulatory requirements.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The basic model of the bank loan
market is presented in section 2. We first model the supply of bank loans in
case of adverse selection and in the absence of regulation. In section 3 we
introduce the Value-at-Risk constraint of credit risk regulation and show that
CVaR regulation induces credit rationing. Section 4 concludes our paper.
2 The bank loan market
Our model is a one period loan market in the spirit of Mankiw (1986). We
assume that each firm can invest in a project that has a size of one unit.
All firms are identical except for their probability of success on the project.
Each project has two possible gross returns. These are X/θ with probability
θ and zero with probability (1 − θ). Hence, the expected gross return for
firms is X, and the variance is 1−θθ X
2.
The risk parameter θ of individual firms is assumed to be distributed on
the interval [α, β] (with 0 ≤ α < β). Firms know their own risk parameter θ,
but do not know the actual outcome of their project. Suppliers of external
finance, i.e. banks, only know the sample distribution of θ for all firms. Thus
1With endogenous supply of deposits credit markets do not completely collapse, whereas
they otherwise might, c.f. Mankiw (1986) and Freixas and Rochet (1997).
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there is an asymmetry in information between what banks know and the
knowledge of the individual entrepreneurs. Since banks cannot discriminate,
bank loans can be obtained at the (gross) interest rate R (R ≥ 1).
2.1 The demand for bank loans
The firms net return depends on the loan repayment at the going gross rate
R. Since the legal system offers firms limited liability, we assume that risk
neutral banks offer standard debt contracts with limited liability. Adding
up, the firm per unit (loan) profit function PF becomes
P F =
½ X
θ −R with probability θ
0 with probability 1− θ
The expected profit for the firm is
E[P F ] = θ(Xθ −R) = X − θR
The variance is (α > 0)






A risk neutral firm only invests if expected profit E[PF ] ≥ 0. The par-
ticipation constraint for firms is therefore satisfied when θ ≤ XR . Note that
the expected returns are an increasing function of risk, consistent with basic
finance theory. We have the following proposition concerning demand
Proposition 1 The total demand for bank loans is decreasing in R if βR is
larger than X and the demand for loans is insensitive to R if βR ≤ X.
Proof. By the assumption that θ has support [α, β], all projects will be
undertaken when βR ≤ X since at βR = X the participation constraint is
satisfied for all firms and a reduction of R will not increase the number of
firms demanding credit. If βR > X, only firms with θ ≤ XR < β are active.
Firms on the interval [α, XR ] apply for bank loans and the proportion of firms




β−α represents the proportion of viable investment projects.
To obtain total demand for credit we will scale this proportion by a factor
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c. The scaling factor c indicates the maximum potential market size. The
demand for loans when βR > X becomes Dd = c
X
R−α
β−α , otherwise Dd = c.
In the following we derive the expected return for banks on their portfolio.
Let the average probability of success be denoted as π = E[θ]. When βR ≤ X





When βR > X, the average probability of succes equals the conditional
expected value of θ for all firms that want to invest







Note that at any given loan rate the firms that choose to invest and turn out
to be successful are always able to repay the bank loan in full, since for these
firms R ≤ Xθ .
2.2 The supply of bank loans
Banks provide loans to firms at an interest rate R. Banks fund these loans in
the deposit market, facing a cost of funding I, the equilibrium interest rate on
the deposit market. Moreover, banks have to pay an actuarially fair insurance
premium to take into account the costs of failing loans. This is to prevent
banks from moral hazard which arises out off the limited liability constraint.
Banks have to pay the actuarial fair insurance premium (1−π(R))I. Because
a firms’ individual (X, θ) combination is private information of the borrower,
R cannot be conditioned on this information. All funded projects are charged
the same interest rate R. The expected per unit profit function for the bank
is thus
E[PB] = π(R)(R− I)− (1− π(R))I
= π(R)R− I.
This profit function consists in two parts. The first part, πR, denotes the
expected gross return of all loans to firms that are successful. The second
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part, I, defines the funding costs of the bank loans. In a perfectly compet-
itive market, bank profits are zero2. In equilibrium the required expected
probability of repayment from the pool of borrowers would be
π = IR. (3)
2.3 The deposit market
When banks want to increase their loan volume they have to attract more
funding for these loans. The nonbank public will increase deposit holdings
if the deposit interest rate I is higher. We model the deposit market rate
I endogenously, cf. Mankiw (1986), who takes deposit supply exogeneous.
The deposit rate is a positive function of the quantity of deposits that needs
to be supplied, Ds. For simplicity we assume a linear supply schedule. The
inverse supply curve of bank deposits by the nonbank public therefore is
I = a+ bDs, a ≤ 1, b > 0 (4)
2.4 Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the equilibrium in the loan market in ab-
sence of regulation. We know the demand and the supply of loans by banks,
depending on the deposit market interest rate I. Assume that θ follows a uni-
form distribution, cf. Mankiw (1986). Deposit market equilibrium requires
Ds = Dd where Dd = c if βR ≤ X, and Dd = c
X
R−α
β−α if βR > X.
Although there is adverse selection in the model, we will see that this
does not result in a complete collapse of the loan market, as is the case in
the model of Mankiw (1986). Though as in all markets, when prices change
quantities adjust, changes in R do affect the amount of credit.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique equilibrium in the loan market if the
project risk parameter θ follows a uniform distribution, F (θ) = θ−αβ−α .
Proof. From proposition 1 we have that either all firms invest or only part
of the firms invest. If βR ≤ X all firms will invest. The equilibrium deposit
rate and loan rate are determined by equations (3) and (4). We know Ds =
2The same modelling strategy is used in Mankiw (1986).
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Dd = c and π = E[θ] = (α+β)
2
, the unconditional expectation of θ. Solving (3)
and (4) for the equilibrium loan rate gives R = a+bc
(α+β)/2 ≤ X/β. If βR > X
only part of the firms invest and Dd = c
X
R−α
β−α . We know the conditional

















β−α . Since π(R) and I(R) are functions of R, we find the equilibrium
interest rate R if we solve equation (3). Rewrite (3) to define H(R) =
π(R)R − I(R). In equilibrium H(R) = 0. Multiply H(R) by R to obtain a





X − a+ αbcβ − α)R−
Xbc
β − α = 0.
This function is convex and is negative at R = 0. Therefore there exist a
positive and a negative root. Thus there exists a unique solution R > 0.
The fact that there always exists an equilibrium in this model is inter-
esting because it is contrary to the results of Mankiw (1986). Mankiw finds
that the credit market may collapse when R becomes too high. The rea-
son for the collapse is that the deposit rate I in Mankiw’s model is held
fixed. Because we model the deposit market endogenously, the market never
completely collapses.
2.5 A graphical exposition
We depict loan supply and demand graphically. Assume θ ∼ U [0, 1], i.e.
α = 0, β = 1. Figure 1 displays the market equilibrium in the (R, π(R))
plane using the shape of the iso-profit curve (equation (3)) and the shape
of the expected repayment curve (equation (2)). As mentioned before, all
firms want to participate in the loan market if R ≤ X and this results in
π = 1
2
. This fact is represented by a straight line segment in the R, π(R)
plane until the cost of borrowing, R, becomes too high at R = X, and the
firms with high θ decide no longer to invest. This is the point where the
adverse selection kicks in. Higher bank loan rates, R > I, are associated
with lower π. The supply of bank loans is decreasing in R. The equilibrium
in case of adverse selection is











Figure 1: Bank loan market equilibrium
Now that we have studied equilibrium in case of absence of regulation, we
will investigate the equilibrium effects of regulation.
3 Credit risk regulation
The motive for the minimum regulatory risk constraint for the bank loan
portfolio is to counter adverse selection and to improve social welfare. We
first demonstrate this motive for Basel II type regulation. Subsequently we
show that this regulation implies credit rationing.
3.1 Social Welfare
The intuition behind CVaR regulation is that it counters adverse selection
and too high interest rates. To validate regulatory intervention, to bring
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down interest rates, we investigate if there is scope for improving the quality
of investments. Social welfare is the sum of welfare for firms, welfare for
banks and welfare for depositors. Since we assume perfect competition in the
banking industry, welfare for banks is zero. Welfare for firms is determined
by the sum of the expected profits of viable projects and equals the expected
returns multiplied by total demand. The expected profits are the difference
between the expected returns and the expected costs. For the time being, we
only investigate the possibility to raise the average quality of the projects.
The deposit rate will be held constant and therefore the welfare for depositors
as in Mankiw (1986). Later, we will look at the welfare implications of
the Credit Value at Risk constraint, when the deposit market is modelled
endogeneously.
Proposition 3 At equilibrium, social welfare would be enhanced by a ceteris
paribus reduction in R.
Proof. First consider that equilibrium is determined by the interest rate
R, under the constraint π(R)R = I. We keep I constant so as to guarantee
there is no welfare loss for deposit holders. At equilibrium the gross expected
revenue of the undertaken project is X. The expected funding costs are
π(R)R. We know π(R)R = I by the competition in the banking sector.
Expected social welfare at equilibrium thus equals X − π(R)R = X − I. To
show that the expected social welfare is higher in case of a reduction in R
we have to determine whether for the population of marginal borrowers the
average of excess return (X − I) is positive. We know that for the marginal
borrower X = θR and therefore we investigate whether θR − I is positive.
From the zero profit condition for banks we know that π(R)R− I = 0. Since
for the marginal borrower θ > π(R) we get that the average of excess returns
(X − I) is positive.
Therefore CVaR regulation has the potential to improve social welfare
if supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at the given deposit rate I. The
intuition is that banks attract better quality loans by lowering R. This is
the aim of the new Basel accord, which hopes to improve the quality of
the loan portfolio by CVaR regulation. Supply of deposits is not perfectly
elastic however, so that in equilibrium CVaR regulation results in a lower
deposit market interest rate. From the previous proposition we know that
an improvement in welfare might be possible. In the following we will first
look at the equilibrium effects of the Basel type of regulation, thereafter we











Figure 2: Bank loan market and credit risk constraint
3.2 The credit risk constraint
Consider a banking supervisor and banking regulation under the planned
Basel II accord. We assume that the supervisor has no better information
than the bank. For this reason the supervisor imposes a risk limit using the
average success rate of loans π in order to improve the quality of the loan
portfolio. Note that the quality of the loan portfolio is strictly increasing in
π(R) and hence decreasing in R. Suppose therefore that credit risk regulation
imposes a lower limit on the average probability of success on repayment
π(R), say (1− π(R)) ≤ δ. We call δ the CVaR constraint on the loan book.
Figure 2 displays the credit risk constraint effective at the bank loan
portfolio risk level πv, where πv = 1−δ. Again, assume θ ∼ U [0, 1], i.e. α = 0,
β = 1. The iso-profit curve of the firms requires that the loan rate is no higher
than Rv. From equations (3) and (4) and the equilibrium result (5), one sees
that when the risk restriction binds, Rv < I0π−1 = I0bc(X/4− a/2)−1. Here
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I0 refers to the deposit rate which prevails in the unconstrained equilibrium
(R∗, π(R∗)) or (bcX(X/2 − a)−1, (X/4 − a/2)(bc)−1). At the lower interest
rate Rv the quality (success rate) of the pool of loan contracts is higher, since
more firms with relatively high quality projects apply for a loan, compared
to the unconstrained equilibrium. So both the average quality as well as
the number of loans demanded increases. At πv and a given deposit rate I0
banks require a loan rate of no less than RB. In this situation loan demand
and supply do not meet. What does it take for banks to be willing to offer
(Rv, πv)? This requires a shift in the bank iso-profit curve to the left. For the
moment we will give the intuition behind this statement. Note that the bank
iso-profit curve implicitly defines the bank supply curve for loans. From (3)
it follows that the only shift parameter of this curve is the deposit rate I. By
lowering I, the loan supply curve shifts to the left until it cuts the demand
curve at (Rv, πv). Assuming that the supply curve for deposits is an upward
sloping function of the deposit rate, banks can reduce the deposit market
rate by taking in fewer deposits. The implication of a lower deposit demand
is a reduction in the supply of loans. Thus while at (Rv, πv) the demand for
loans increases vis a vis the free market solution, the supply is reduced. Loan
market equilibrium can then be achieved only if banks ration the supply of
bank loans at the given quality level πv. The quality of the loan portfolio
must at least be πv. This condition can be met in expectation since banks
necessarily select the loan applicants randomly. Thus the equilibrium under
a binding CVaR constraint involves random credit rationing.
We will now prove this formally. When the CVaR constraint is binding
we have πvR = I. Solving for R using the firms investment demand function,
we find
Rv = Xπv .
The Value at Risk constraint is binding if R∗ > Rv, where R∗ denotes the
unconstrained equilibrium loan rate.
Deposit market equilibrium requires Ds = Dd where Dd = c if R ≤ X,
and Dd = c
X
R−α
β−α if βR > X. The zero profit condition for banks implies
πR = I and the supply of deposits is determined by Ds = I−ab . We have the
following result
Proposition 4 Equilibrium in a credit market with binding CVaR regulation














Figure 3: Deposit market
Proof. If βR∗ > X we know equilibrium in the deposit market implies
Ds = Dd. Introducing the portfolio quality constraint decreases R from R∗






Because of the lower R, the funding cost for banks, I, has to decrease, since




X and dIdR > 0. However, a lower deposit rate will lower
deposit supply, since Ds = I−ab and
dDs
dI > 0. Hence, D
s < Dd if R decreases
from R∗ to Rv so that the supply of deposits will not meet demand.
In figure 3 we show the effect of VaR regulation on total deposit demand.
Rationing keeps the loan quality at 1− δ. The excess demand for deposits,
given Iv, is the difference between Ddv and Dv. Banks have to ration firms
and only a fraction D
v
Ddv of the firms obtains loans.
Now that we have found the equilibrium in the credit market in case of
CVaR regulation, we like to investigate whether this improves social welfare
or not for the case when deposit supply is not perfectly elastic. Regulation
improves the quality of the loan portfolio, but there are two adverse effects
lowering welfare. The most important effect is credit rationing, lowering the
number of firms obtaining financing. The second effect is the lower deposit
market interest rate, lowering the welfare surplus for depositors (W d). In
the (I,D) plane the welfare for depositors is equal to the surface of the
triangle established by the points (I∗, D∗), (0, D∗)and (1,D1) (where I∗ and
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D∗ denote the equilibrium deposit rate en equilibrium deposit supply). We
show that total welfare will decrease.
Proposition 5 CVaR regulation lowers social welfare.
Proof. We have to evalate two cases. Welfare by firms (W f) can be
increasing in the deposit rate (the first case, dW
f
dI > 0) and welfare by firms
can be decreasing in the deposit rate. If welfare by firms is decreasing in
the deposit rate (case 2) we have to evaluate whether the welfare gain by
firms is larger than the welfare loss for depositors. Total welfare by firms is
equal to the expected welfare by individual firms, X − I (as is shown in the
proof of proposition (3)) multiplied by total demand, W f = D(X− I) where
D = I−ab . The first case (
dWf
dI > 0) holds if X + a− 2I > 0 and in this case
CVaR regulation unambiguously lowers social welfare. In the second case
dWf
dI < 0. Let D
∗(X − I∗) denote the quantity of loans made in absence of
regulation multiplied by the average firm welfare in absence of regulation.
Let Dv(X − Iv) denote the quantity of loans made in case of regulation
multiplied by the average firm welfare in case of regulation. The increase in
welfare by firms (dW f) is the difference between Dv(X−Iv) and D∗(X−I∗).
The welfare loss for depositors is equal to (I∗− Iv)Dv+ 1
2
(I∗− Iv)(D∗−Dv).
The increase in welfare is positive if dW f > dW d or
Dv(X − Iv)−D∗(X − I∗) > (I∗ − Iv)Dv + 1
2
(I∗ − Iv)(D∗ −Dv)
which is equivalent to X < I∗+Iv
2
. This is not the case since X ≥ I∗ > Iv.
It is interesting to note that regulation Q in the United States had similar
consequences as the risk constraint δ. Under regulation Q in the United
States and similar arrangements elsewhere, the regulator imposed an upper
limit on the deposit rate. This ceiling on the deposit rate was imposed until
april 1986. The main justification for a maximum deposit rate was that it
would lower the funding costs for banks. However, it induces credit rationing,
as is stated in the following
Corollary 6 Regulation Q has similar effects as the risk constraint δ
Proof. Regulation Q limits I to IQ < I. When this constraint is binding,
it is straigtforward to show that the supply of loans is lower than the demand
for loans (the proof is similar to the proof of proposition 4) and therefore there
will be credit rationing.
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By limiting the deposit rate I to a maximum, banks face an excess demand
for loans, as is the case with the risk constraint δ. To achieve equilibrium the
deposit rate should be higher. In this case the constraint is on the deposit
interest rate rather than on the loan quality, but the effects are identical.
3.3 Effect on monetary policy
We have seen in the previous section that a binding CVaR restriction requires
the deposit rate to fall and therefore induces a fall in the volume of bank de-
posits. In macroeconomic models the fall in bank deposits equals a reduction
in the money supply, and in the familiar ISLM model this can be visualized
as a leftward shift of the LM curve. Moreover, credit rationing induced by
the CVaR restriction reduces firms’ investment spending and shifts the IS
curve to the left as well. Clearly, without a monetary policy response, the
combined shifts of the LM and IS curves due to the regulatory CVaR shock
could cause a significant reduction in macroeconomic activity.
Empirical research on the effects of bank capital regulation has focused
on the introduction of the minimum capital requirements of the 1988 Basle
Accord. We are not aware of empirical evidence on the relationship between
bank capital regulation and credit rationing of individual firms. In fact, there
are very few studies offering any direct evidence on credit rationing. With
regard to the reduction in bank deposits, preliminary results in a study by
Smith (2002) suggest that the introduction of Basle I lowered the growth
rate of the money supply, consistent with our model. Most studies on the
introduction of the 1988 Basle Accord have examined its effects on the over-
all volume of bank lending, and some studies investigated whether banks
shifted the composition of their balance sheets towards or away from risky
asset types. The evidence for G-10 countries on the response of banks to the
enforcement of the 1988 capital adequacy requirements are surveyed in Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). The paper’s main finding is that
“there is some evidence that bank capital pressures during cyclical down-
turns in the US and Japan may have limited bank lending in those periods
and contributed to the economic weakness in some macroeconomic sectors”.
However, the report also states that the effects “may well have reflected both
regulatory and market pressures”. Sharpe (1995), following his survey of the
literature, argues that the evidence in favor of a capital crunch in the United
States during 1989-1992 is inconclusive; the only exception being the evi-
dence for banking in New England where the support for a capital crunch is
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reasonably firm. All in all, it would take more empirical research to pinpoint
the effects of Basle I on credit, but at least there is some empirical evidence
which supports our theory.
4 Conclusion
In the first part of the paper we have extended a microeconomic model of
credit provisioning in case of asymmetric information. By making the cost
of funds for banks dependent on the deposit market interest rate, we show
that there always exists an equilibrium in the market for bank loans. The
adverse selection effect which lowers the loan volume when the loan rate rises,
is countered by lower costs for banks, because of a lower deposit rate. In the
second part we discuss current proposals for a new Basle capital adequacy
accord which sponsor the idea that banks should be allowed to use internal
credit risk models to compute the required capital adequacy on bank loans, in
contrast to the existing but outdated Basle I standards. We have shown that
a credit risk model based Value-at-Risk constraint when binding, distorts the
operation of credit markets as it involves credit rationing. It was shown that
this type of regulation lowers social welfare.
––—
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